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VIRGINIA'S AUGMENTED ESTATE SYSTEM:
AN OVERVIEW
J. William Gray, Jr.*
I. INTRODUCTION
The New Year 1991 will bring in an entirely new system of prop-
erty rights for surviving spouses in Virginia. As of the end of 1990,
the centuries-old concepts of dower and curtesy will disappear
from the Code of Virginia (the "Code"). The current will renuncia-
tion and spouse's election provisions of estate law also will be
scrapped. House Bill No. 8081 replaces those historic concepts with
an "augmented estate" system modeled after the Uniform Probate
Code2 (the "U.P.C."), but having several features unique to the
Commonwealth. This article examines the mechanics of the new
system, with particular emphasis on features that may require
both conveyancers and estate planners to rethink traditional pro-
cedures and planning techniques.
Under the augmented estate system, an individual may be free
to dispose of assets during lifetime without his spouse's permission
or approval. At the individual's death, however, the spouse may
choose to reject the provisions that the decedent made and instead
may choose to claim a statutory fraction of the decedent's estate.
The fraction is not based solely on the net probate estate, as under
current law; instead, the probate estate is "augmented" by the
value of (i) all non-probate assets remaining at the decedent's
death and (ii) certain assets that the decedent transferred during
lifetime. If the value of property the spouse has received or is enti-
tled to receive from the decedent through both lifetime and testa-
mentary transfers is less than the required fraction of the aug-
mented estate, all other recipients of the decedent's property may
be liable for a portion of the shortfall.
* Partner, Hunton & Williams, Richmond, Virginia; B.S., B.A., 1973, Rutgers University;
J.D., 1977, University of Virginia; former chairman of the Board of Governors, Trusts and
Estates Section, Virginia State Bar.
1. 1990 Va. Acts 1354. Delegate Howard E. Copeland of Virginia Beach was the primary
sponsor of the legislation. Senator Robert L. Calhoun of Alexandria introduced identical
provisions in the Senate as Senate Bill No. 233.
2. UNIF. PROB. CODE §§ 2-201 to -207, 8 U.L.A. 73-87 (1983).
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II. BACKGROUND
The new system addresses three perceived shortcomings in the
current statutory system for protecting a surviving spouse against
disinheritance.3 First, the existing dower and curtesy rules are con-
fusing and in some cases inconsistent.4 They can present signifi-
cant real estate title problems, particularly now that dower and
curtesy give the surviving spouse a fee simple interest rather than
the traditional life estate.' These practical considerations led com-
mentators to advocate changes in Virginia's system as long as three
decades ago."
Second, the effect of dower and curtesy on the typical estate is
diminishing because those concepts apply only to real estate.
They offered substantial protection to spouses in a rural society,
where a farm or other land holdings comprised the bulk of most
families' wealth. In today's increasingly urban Virginia, however,
that security is greatly reduced because the family's wealth is more
likely to lie in money, securities, business interests, life insurance,
employee benefits or other intangible personal property. Moreover,
one can defeat a spouse's dower or curtesy rights simply by taking
title through a Virginia land trust,8 through a corporation or part-
nership,' in a joint tenancy with a third party with right of survi-
vorship, 10 or in "sole and separate equitable estate" form."
3. For a general discussion of several ways to disinherit a surviving spouse, see Johnson,
Interspousal Property Rights at Death, 10 VA. B.A.J. No. 3 at 10 (1984).
4. See Spies, Property Rights of the Surviving Spouse, 46 VA. L. REV. 157, 173-76 (1960).
5. When dower and curtesy entitled the surviving spouse to a life estate only, a purchaser
from the decedent could derive some comfort from knowing that the dower and curtesy
rights of previous owners' spouses terminated at those spouses' deaths. Now that dower and
curtesy entitle the surviving spouse to a one-third fee simple interest, however, that interest
will pass to the surviving spouse's devisees or heirs.
6. See, e.g., Johnson, Abolition of Dower in Virginia: The Uniform Probate Code as an
Alternative to Proposed Legislation, 7 U. RICH. L. REV. 99 (1972); Lewis, It's Time to Abol-
ish Dower and Curtesy in Virginia, 3 U. RICH. L. REv. 299 (1969); Spies, supra note 4.
7. See VA. CODE ANn. § 64.1-19 (Repl. Vol. 1987).
8. See generally id. § 55-17.1 (Repl. Vol. 1986), which confirms that the beneficial interest
in a land trust is personal property and therefore not subject to dower or curtesy.
9. The decedent's ownership interest in the title-holding entity would be personal prop-
erty and not subject to dower or curtesy.
10. The decedent thus would not have an estate of inheritance to which dower or curtesy
rights could attach.
11. See VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-21 (Repl. Vol. 1987 & Cune. Supp. 1990). See also Jacobs v.
Meade, 227 Va. 284, 315 S.E.2d 383 (1984) (previous version of § 64.1-21, providing that a
husband was not entitled to curtesy in the equitable separate estate of his deceased wife,
must apply equally to extinguish a surviving wife's dower rights in her deceased husband's
equitable separate estate in light of § 64.1-19.1, which declares that references to "curtesy"
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Third, a surviving spouse's right to share in the decedent's per-
sonal property upon renunciation is defined as a fraction of the
probate estate.' 2 Renunciation rights do not attach to property
passing by non-probate means. The current spousal election sys-
tem therefore allows an individual effectively to disinherit a surviv-
ing spouse by owning non-probate property, e.g., an interest in an
irrevocable trust, an asset owned jointly with right of survivorship,
or life insurance, employee benefits or other contract rights paya-
ble to a surviving third party.13
The augmented estate system resulted from seven years of Vir-
ginia legislative activity aimed at the property rights of surviving
spouses. The original legislative proposal, introduced in 1983,11
would have applied the augmented estate concept to personal
property only, leaving the existing dower and curtesy system to
govern real property rights. A legislative study subcommittee con-
stituted by the 1983 General Assembly reported in 1984 that the
dower and curtesy system did not provide sufficient protection
against disinheritance, but its report did not recommend specific
changes.' 5 Legislation introduced or carried over into each General
Assembly session since then, however, has proposed to apply the
augmented estate concept to both real and personal property.' 6
III. REPEAL OF DOWER AND CURTESY
The augmented estate statute removes from the Code all provi-
sions for inchoate dower and curtesy rights after the end of 1990.
The current rules will remain applicable, however, to dower and
shall be construed to include "dower").
12. See VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-16 (Repl. Vol. 1987), which allows the surviving spouse to
renounce the decedent's will and claim one-third of "the surplus of the decedent's personal
estate mentioned in § 64.1-11" if the decedent left surviving children or their descendants
and one-half of that surplus if no children or their descendants survived. VA. CODE ANN. §
64.1-11 (Repl. Vol. 1987) defines the surplus as the decedent's personal estate "subject to
the provisions of ... [§ 64.1-151.1 et seq.] after payment of funeral expenses, charges of
administration and debts."
13. But cf. Bickers v. Shenandoah Valley Nat'l Bank, 197 Va. 145, 88 S.E.2d 889 (1955)
(wife's elective share included nonprobate property that her husband had transferred with a
retained lifetime right to reacquire).
14. S.B. 337, Va. Gen. Assembly, 1983 Sess. (1983).
15. See INTERIM REPORT OF THE JOINT SUBCOMMITTEE STUDYING VIRGINIA LAWS AS IT [SIC]
AFFECTS TRANSFERS OF PROPERTY UPON DEATH TO THE GOVERNOR AND GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF
VIRGINIA, (S. Doc. NO. 9 (1984)) [hereinafter 1984 STUDY REPORT].
16. See H.B. 801, Va. Gen. Assembly (1986-87); H.B. 858 (1988-89); H.B. 808, S.B. 233
(1990).
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curtesy interests vested before January 1, 1991, and to the rights of
creditors and other interested parties in any real estate subject to
dower or curtesy. The rights of those parties and the procedures
for assigning, valuing, and enforcing those rights will continue to
be governed by pre-1991 law.'7
Several related concepts 'will cease to apply once dower and
curtesy are repealed. For example, the sole and separate equitable
estate form of title will no longer protect property from a spouse's
claims, even if title vested before 1991.18 The rules of jointure, by
which a decedent could force his surviving spouse to elect as to
dower, also will be replaced by the new elective share system. A
"quarantine" rule, however, will continue to apply to the principal
family residence. Until the surviving spouse's rights in the resi-
dence have been determined and satisfied by agreement of the par-
ties or by a final court order, the spouse may continue to occupy
the house and curtilage without liability for rent, repairs, taxes, or
insurance.' 9
The repeal of dower and curtesy should simplify land transfers
by eliminating the need to secure the transferor's spouse's con-
sent20 and avoiding the creation of vested interests in a surviving
spouse. At the same time, it will eliminate two protective features
of the current system: (1) an effective veto power for the surviving
spouse over the transferor's lifetime conveyances and (2) the sur-
viving spouse's priority over the transferor's creditors. Under cur-
rent law, after an individual has acquired an estate of inheritance
in real property during the marriage, he cannot unilaterally defeat
his spouse's inchoate dower or curtesy rights and convey clear title
to a third party. It is unlikely that individuals newly freed of this
17. See VA. CODE ANn. § 64.1-19.2 (Cum. Supp. 1990).
18. Through an apparent oversight, the General Assembly failed to repeal VA. CODE ANN.
§ 57-47 (Repl. Vol. 1986), which provides that equitable separate estates "may be created as
heretofore and shall be held in all respects according to the provisions of the instrument by
which they are created and with all the powers conferred by such instrument." Even if this
provision were construed to retain the concept of equitable separate estates in Virginia law
in some form, the augmented estate system should be unaffected. At common law, the equi-
table separate estate served only to keep a woman's property free from her husband's debts
and control and to protect it from curtesy claims. See generally 1 J. MINOR, INSTITUTES OF
COMMON AND STATUTORY LAW 345-64 (4th ed. 1891). As curtesy and dower have been re-
pealed and the augmented estate statute does not contain an exception for equitable sepa-
rate estates, such property should be included in the decedent's augmented estate and thus
should be subject to the surviving spouse's claims even if the decedent now holds title in
equitable separate estate form.
19. See VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-16.4 (Cum. Supp. 1990).
20. But see infra text accompanying notes 61-64.
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constraint by the 1990 amendments will rush to impoverish them-
selves by conveying away their land without adequate considera-
tion. In a few cases, however, they may sell property and spend the
proceeds or incur debts that effectively reduce their estate size.
The surviving spouse's elective share of the augmented estate
also will not have the priority over the decedent's creditors that
dower and curtesy interests currently enjoy. A spouse's dower or
curtesy interest is set off before any payment to general creditors
whose claims arose during the marriage; but the spouse's share of
the augmented estate will be based- upon only the net estate re-
maining after all debts are paid.21 To provide a minimum level of
protection for the surviving spouse of a debtor, the General Assem-
bly has increased the amount of the homestead allowance from
$5,000 to $10,000 as of January 1, 1991.2 When combined with a
family allowance that can be $6,000 or more 23 and an exempt prop-
erty allowance of up to $3,500,24 the homestead allowance enables
the spouse to shelter $19,500 or more from the decedent's credi-
tors. The surviving spouse may obtain the exempt property and
family allowances in addition to a share of the augmented estate,
but the homestead allowance is available only in lieu of an aug-
mented estate election. 5
IV. COMPOSITION OF THE AUGMENTED ESTATE
In addition to simplifying land titles, the new system seeks to
restore traditional safeguards against disinheritance by "aug-
menting" the probate estate that is subject to the surviving
spouse's election. At the same time, it attempts to protect the de-
cedent's estate plan by charging against the elective share most
property that the spouse derived from the decedent through any
21. See VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-16.1 (Cum. Supp. 1990).
22. See id. § 64.1-151.3.
23. See id. § 64.1-151.1. This section allows the spouse or minor children to claim "a
reasonable allowance out of the estate for their maintenance during the period of adminis-
tration." Id. This allowance has priority over all claims against the estate, but it may not
continue for more than one year if the estate is inadequate to discharge all allowed claims.
The family allowance may not exceed $6,000 or the equivalent in periodic installments with-
out court approval. See id. § 64.1-151.4 (Repl. Vol. 1987).
24. See id. § 64.1-151.2 (Cum. Supp. 1990) (allowing the spouse to claim up to $3,500 of
personal property, with priority over all claims against the estate, but not over the family
allowance).
25. See id. § 64.1-151.3. For a more detailed discussion of these statutory allowances, see
Johnson, Wills, Trust and Estates: Annual Survey of Virginia Law 24 U. RICH. L. REV. 827
(1990).
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combination of probate and non-probate means. This prevents a
surviving spouse who already has received a fair share of the dece-
dent's total estate from claiming an additional share of the probate
assets.
The revised rules for spouses' elections bear at least a superficial
resemblance to the current will renunciation system. The fraction
that the surviving spouse may claim is one third if the decedent
left children or their descendants surviving; and it increases to one
half if there are no surviving children or descendants.26 These con-
tinued references to the spouse's traditional fractions of the per-
sonal estate,27 however, conceal three important changes. First, the
augmented estate system extends renunciation rights to every sur-
viving spouse, regardless of whether the decedent left a will.2" The
current statutory scheme applies only to testate decedents and
provides no protection in intestacy.29 Second, because real estate
now will be treated like personal property, a childless decedent's
spouse will be able to claim half of the real estate rather than the
smaller one-third share available under current dower and curtesy
rules.30 Third, the statute calculates the spouse's share by refer-
ence to property that was not subject to traditional elective rights.
The process of identifying those assets is at the heart of the new
system.
The starting point of the augmented estate definition is the
traditional probate estate, that is, "the estate, real and personal,
after payment of allowances and exemptions elected [the exempt
property and family and homestead allowances] . . . , funeral ex-
penses, charges of administration and debts."3' To that fund of
probate property, the statute adds the value of two distinct groups
of non-probate assets: (1) property that the decedent transferred
to or for the benefit of a third party and (2) property that the
surviving spouse derived from the decedent.3 2 The former category
represents arrangements that are essentially will substitutes or
26. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-16 (Cum. Supp. 1990).
27. Compare id. § 64.1-16 (Repl. Vol. 1987) (effective through Dec. 31, 1990) with id. §
64.1-16 (Cum. Supp. 1990) (effective Jan. 1, 1991).
28. Id. § 64.1-13 (Cum. Supp. 1990).
29. Id. § 64.1-13 (Repl. Vol. 1987). This section authorizes the surviving spouse to "re-
nounce the will," and has no counterpart in the statutory provisions for intestate succession.
See generally id. §§ 64.1-1 to -11 (Repl. Vol. 1987 & Cum. Supp. 1990).
30. Id. §§ 64.1-16, -16.1(Cum. Supp. 1990).
31. Id. § 64.1-16.1.
32. Id. §§ 64.1-16.1(3), -16(1).
[Vol. 24:513
1990] AUGMENTED ESTATE 519
that significantly deplete the probate estate, thus reducing the
fund over which the spouse otherwise would have election rights
under current law. Its inclusion in the augmented estate is consis-
tent with the statutory goal of protecting the spouse against disin-
heritance.3 3 In contrast, the latter category represents property
that the decedent already has transferred to the surviving spouse
by non-probate means. Its inclusion (and subsequent charging
against the spouse's share of the estate) prevents a spouse who al-
ready has received ample provision from disrupting the decedent's
estate plan by claiming more.
A. Inclusionary Rules
Property transferred to a third party may be brought into the
decedent's augmented estate only if it was transferred during the
marriage and only to the extent it was transferred without ade-
quate and full consideration. 4 By excluding transfers made before
the marriage, the statute allows an individual to make gifts, for
example, to children of a prior marriage without fear that those
arrangements will be upset by the claims of a spouse whom the
transferor marries later. By ignoring transfers for adequate consid-
eration, the statute seeks to reach only transactions that effectively
reduce the decedent's estate value. Subject to those threshold re-
quirements, the augmented estate will include the value of prop-
33. The 1984 legislative study committee considered proposals to exclude transfers to mi-
nor children and charitable beneficiaries. See 1984 STUDY REPORT, supra note 15, at 18. It
appears to have concluded, however, that (1) the proposed exceptions were inconsistent with
the primary goal of protecting the surviving spouse and (2) transfers to other beneficiaries
enjoyed sufficient protection through the rules exempting outright transfers of up to $10,000
per year and all transfers before the marriage and the rule limiting a third party's contribu-
tion liability to the value of the property (or proceeds) remaining in his possession at the
decedent's death. See infra text accompanying notes 35, 41-44, 80-92.
34. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-16.1(3) (Cum. Supp. 1990). The concept of "an adequate and
full consideration in money or money's worth" was borrowed from federal transfer tax law.
See I.R.C. §§ 2043, 2512(b) (West 1989). The federal estate tax regulations require the par-
ties to have dealt in good faith. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2043-1(a) (1988). These regulations also
declare that a relinquishment of marital rights in the decedent's property or estate is not a
consideration in money or money's worth. See id. § 20.2043-1(b). The estate tax regulations,
literally applied, might appear to impose estate tax on the difference between the full fair
market value and the consideration received in any transfer. The federal gift tax regula-
tions, however, make clear that a transfer will be considered made for full and adequate
consideration-regardless of the actual value received-if it occurs "in the ordinary course
of business. . . [and is] bona fide, at arm's length, and free from any donative intent." Id. §
25.2512-8. This protection from an unintended tax result of a bad bargain should carry over
into the Virginia augmented estate rules both through the "adequate and full consideration"
language and the "bona fide purchaser" exception.
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erty transferred to anyone other than the surviving spouse if (1)
the decedent retained lifetime rights to possess or enjoy the prop-
erty or to receive the income from it, 5 (2) the decedent retained a
lifetime revocation power or a power to consume, invade, or dis-
pose of principal for his own benefit, whether the power is exercis-
able alone or only in conjunction with another person, 6 (3) the de-
cedent and another person owned the property with right of
survivorship, (4) the decedent had transferred the property causa
mortis,37 or (5) the aggregate value of the decedent's transfers to
that donee had exceeded $10,000 in a calendar year, although in
this last case only the excess value of the transfers is included.
Although derived from the U.P.C., the first three of these rules
may seem especially familiar to tax practitioners who deal regu-
larly with the estate tax provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. 8
Like their tax code counterparts, these rules will add the value of
transferred property to the decedent's estate if he has retained
substantial rights after the transfer. The augmented estate statute,
however, does not contain all of the "finespun tests of the Federal
Estate Tax Law." 9 While Virginia practitioners and courts may
35. The decedent must have retained such rights "for his life, for any period not ascer-
tainable without reference to his death or for any period which does not in fact end before
his death." VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-16.1(3)(a) (Cum. Supp. 1990). Retaining rights for a period
of years therefore is permissible if the decedent does not die within the specified period. On
the other hand, retaining rights that would end, for example, two hours before his death
would cause the transfer to fall within this rule.
36. This power likewise will cause the property to be includable in the augmented estate
only if the decedent retained such rights "for his life, for any period not ascertainable with-
out reference to his death or for any period which does not in fact end before his death." Id.
§ 64.1-16.1.
37. A gift causa mortis is "a gift of personal property made by a party in the expectation
of death then imminent, and upon the essential condition that the property shall belong to
the donee in case the donor dies as expected, leaving the donee surviving him, and the gift is
not in the meantime revoked." 2 G. SMITH, HARRISON ON WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION 152 (3d
ed. 1985).
38. Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-16.1 (Cum. Supp. 1990) with I.R.C. § 2036 (West
1989) (transfers with retained life estate) and I.R.C. § 2037 (transfers taking effect at death)
and I.R.C. § 2038 (revocable transfers) and I.R.C. § 2040 (joint interests), and I.R.C. § 2041
(powers of appointment).
39. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-202 comment, 8 U.L.A. 77, 78 (1983). The drafters explained:
"[Tlhe objectives of the tax law are different from those involved here in the Probate Code,
and the present section is therefore more limited. It is intended to reach the kinds of trans-
fers readily usable to defeat an elective share in only the probate estate." Id.
The Virginia provisions refer to the same retained rights mentioned in the U.P.C. but add
Internal Revenue Code language to define the period for which the rights must be retained.
The Virginia statute, however, does not contain the intricate Internal Revenue Code provi-
sions governing, for example, retention of voting rights, see I.R.C. § 2036(b) (West 1989);
retained interests in business enterprises, see I.R.C. § 2036(c); de minimis reversionary in-
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draw analogies from the federal principles, therefore, it is entirely
possible that a separate body of state law will evolve.
The other inclusionary rules actually owe more to federal tax law
than to the U.P.C. If the decedent retained no rights in the prop-
erty, the U.P.C. augmented estate includes gratuitous transfers to
third parties only to the extent that (1) the donee received more
than $3,000 of value in a calendar year and (2) the transfer oc-
curred within two years of the decedent's death."° The drafters'
comments indicate that they intended to prevent the decedent
from defeating the surviving spouse's election rights through last-
minute transfers from his probate estate.41 The Virginia provision
including causa mortis transfers fulfills this purpose; but the stat-
ute goes still further, including in the augmented estate all annual
transfers in excess of $10,000 per donee regardless of how long
before death the transfers occurred.42 This is closely analogous to
the federal estate tax rule that takes taxable gifts into account in
determining the decedent's federal estate tax liability.43
In addition to property the decedent transferred to third parties,
the augmented estate will include certain property that the surviv-
ing spouse owned or acquired at the decedent's death. Such prop-
erty will be counted if it (1) is derived from the decedent, (2) is
acquired by any means other than testate or intestate succession,
(3) is acquired without a full consideration in money or money's
worth, and (4) is not tangible personal property.4 It is immaterial
whether the transfers were made before or during the marriage.
terests, see I.R.C. § 2037(a)(2); tenancies by the entirety and qualified joint interests of
husband and wife, see I.R.C. § 2040(a), (b); or ascertainable standards or "five and five"
powers, see I.R.C. § 2041(b).
40. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-202(1)(iv), 8 U.L.A. 76 (1983).
41. Id. comment, 8 U.L.A. at 77.
42. This departure from the U.P.C. format was intentional. The 1984 legislative commit-
tee debated the policy merits of a time limit on the outright transfers that could be included
in the augmented estate. See 1984 STUDY REPORT, supra note 4, at 19. During consideration
of House Bill 808, the Senate defeated a floor amendment that would have excluded from
the decedents augmented estate all outright transfers made more than five years before his
death.
43. See I.R.C. § 2001(b) (West 1989). One aspect of the Virginia rule is slightly more
inclusive in that the augmented estate might include the excess value of certain amounts
transferred to pay educational or medical expenses even though those transfers would be
ignored for federal gift and estate tax purposes. See id. §§ 2503(e), 2001(b). On the other
hand, the augmented estate would not include the first $10,000 of the value of future inter-
ests transferred even though those transfers would be subject to federal gift tax and would
be included in computing the federal estate tax. See id. §§ 2503(b), 2001(b).
44. See VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-16.1 (Cum. Supp. 1990).
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UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
Thus the decedent's transfers to relatives or friends before the
marriage will not count against his augmented estate; but he will
receive the benefit of any provisions he may have made then for
the person who later would become his spouse.
Direct lifetime gifts from the decedent to the surviving spouse
and non-probate transfers at the decedent's death are included in
the augmented estate. The statute does not specify what other
property is "derived from the decedent." The U.P.C. provision on
which it is based, however, applies the term expansively to include
such property as a beneficial interest in a living trust created by
the decedent, certain life insurance and annuity proceeds attribu-
table to the decedent's premium payments, the commuted value of
pension or retirement payments (other than social security) attrib-
utable to the decedent's employment or disability, survivorship or
pay-on-death property, and community property interests.45
Along with property derived from the decedent that the spouse
owned or acquired at the decedent's death, the augmented estate
will include like property that the spouse transferred to third par-
ties without adequate consideration. Just as the decedent cannot
defeat the spouse's claims by depleting the estate during lifetime,
so the spouse cannot gain an increased share of the estate by giv-
ing away property that the decedent already had provided for the
spouse's support. The statute includes in the decedent's aug-
mented estate (and ultimately charges against the spouse's share)
all property that would have been included in the surviving
spouse's augmented estate if the order of deaths had been
reversed.46
B. Exclusionary Rules
But for several important statutory exceptions, the third-party
transfer rules described above would bring into the augmented es-
45. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-202, 8 U.L.A. 76-77 (1983).
46. See VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-16.1 (Cum. Supp. 1990). This Virginia provision is broader
than its U.P.C. counterpart because it does not require the original transfer from the dece-
dent to the spouse to have been for less than full consideration. A literal reading of the
Virginia provision therefore would include in the augmented estate (and charge against the
surviving spouse's elective share) the value of property that the spouse originally acquired
from the decedent by a purchase or an exchange for other property of equal value. This
result would be inconsistent with the overall theory of the augmented estate. The U.P.C.
consideration language appears to have been omitted inadvertently when the Virginia draft-




tate the excess value of practically all gifts to third parties during
the marriage. These major exceptions are essential to understand-
ing the augmented estate system, as they narrow the scope of the
statute and can provide significant planning opportunities. They
exclude from the augmented estate (1) certain property irrevocably
transferred before 1991, (2) certain property transferred with the
spouse's written consent or joinder, (3) certain property acquired
by the decedent during the marriage and maintained as separate
property, and (4) all property transferred to a bona fide purchaser.
Pre-1991 transfers are excluded only to the extent that the
transfers are irrevocable on January 1, 1991.11 It appears that the
decedent may retain any other right, including a right to income or
a special power of appointment, so long as he does not retain a
revocation power. This exception, however, does not apply to prop-
erty transferred to the surviving spouse. It is logical that a dece-
dent who had adequately provided for his surviving spouse before
1991 should not be penalized because of the timing of his transfers.
While less defensible on spousal protection grounds, the exclusion
of other pre-1991 irrevocable transfers may be justified by consid-
erations of fairness and practicality: in the typical situation, an in-
dividual simply will not have records of most pre-1991 transfers
because they had no continuing tax or estate administration effect
under the law in force then.
The consent or joinder exception also is grounded in basic prin-
ciples of fairness: as to transfers made under the new system, the
surviving spouse should not be able to reclaim property after hav-
ing approved or participated in its transfer. Written consent or
joinder is required, but neither the statute nor the U.P.C. provides
further guidance on the permissible methods of showing consent or
joinder. The spouse's signature on the deed of gift or other transfer
instrument would suffice, absent evidence of fraud, duress, undue
influence, or other similar circumstances. It is unclear what other
methods of consent or joinder would be effective and whether the
spouse must show his approval contemporaneously or instead can
47. While the U.P.C. includes no comparable grandfather clause or specific transition rule
for its augmented estate provisions, the general U.P.C. effective date provision declares that
"an act done before the effective date in any proceeding and any accrued right is not im-
paired by this Code." UNIF. PROB. CODE § 8-101(b)(4), 8 U.L.A. 565 (1983). As to any court
proceeding affected by the U.P.C., the court may determine that "the former procedure
should be made applicable in a particular case in the interest of justice or because of in-
feasibility of application of the procedure of this Code." Id. § 8-101(b)(2).
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do so after the transfer.48
The separate property exception removes from the augmented
estate the value of all property, its income or proceeds, that any-
one other than the surviving spouse transferred to the decedent by
gift, will or intestate succession during the marriage.4 9 In order for
it to qualify for the exception the decedent must have maintained
it as separate property. The statute does not define the term "sep-
arate property," and the U.P.C. contains no comparable exception.
In the absence of direct authority, the augmented estate concept
of separate property probably will be based upon the separate
property rules of Virginia's equitable distribution statute, which
determines the property rights of divorcing spouses." The differ-
ences in the effect of property classification under the two statu-
tory systems, however, ultimately may cause the augmented estate
rules to diverge from their equitable distribution counterparts.
Under the equitable distribution rules, a two-step process deter-
48. Would the spouse's signature on the decedent's gift tax return, electing for federal gift
tax purposes to split a gift to an individual, qualify as consent or joinder for augmented
estate purposes? What is the effect of the couple's subsequent filing of a joint income tax
return claiming a contribution deduction for the decedent's gift to charity? Those actions
may show the spouse's acquiescence or they may show only that, having been unable to
prevent the decedent from transferring the assets in question, the spouse did not want to
lose any gift tax or income tax benefits that might result.
49. See VA_ CODE ANN. § 64.1-16.1 (Cum. Supp. 1990).
50. See id. § 20-107.3(A)(1) to (3) (Repl. Vol. 1990). New equitable distribution rules for
distinguishing between separate property and marital property and identifying "hybrid"
property went into effect July 1, 1990. See id. § 20-107.3. Income from separate property is
marital property if attributable to personal efforts that either spouse applied directly to the
property. Any increase in the value of separate property during the marriage will be marital
property only to the extent that (i) marital property contributed to the increase or (ii) the
significant personal efforts of either spouse resulted in substantial appreciation of the prop-
erty. Personal efforts are "labor, effort, inventiveness, physical or intellectual skills, creativ-
ity, or managerial activity and promotional or marketing activity, applied directly to the
separate property." Id. § 20-107.3(A)(3)(e).
For example, if the decedent had inherited a rental house during the marriage that re-
mained titled in his sole name, the status of the rent received would depend upon several
factors. If the decedent had turned management over to a rental agent who was responsible
for collecting the rents, making repairs, and otherwise dealing with the property, and if he
deposited the rent checks into an account in his sole name, the income would remain sepa-
rate property. On the other hand, if the decedent took an active role in the property man-
agement or if he deposited the rent checks in a joint account with his spouse, the income
would be classified as marital property for equitable distribution purposes. If he used mari-
tal funds to pay the mortgage or to make improvements to the property, a proportionate
part of any increase in the property value would be marital property. Participation by the
decedent or the spouse in property management would not cause any portion of the increase
to be classified as marital property unless the personal efforts of either party were "signifi-
cant" and the resulting increase in value was "substantial."
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mines the effect of eachasset. The court first classifies the asset as
separate or marital property; and then it determines whether ei-
ther spouse is entitled to a monetary award based upon the value
of the marital property.5 1 The court has no such discretion under
the augmented estate statute; instead, assets classified as marital
property will be included automatically in the augmented estate
and thus will be subject to the spouse's right of election.
Despite any apparent similarities, the separate property excep-
tion under the augmented estate rules is considerably narrower
than its equitable distribution counterpart. The augmented estate
exception applies only to separate property that either party ac-
quired during the marriage, while the equitable distribution defini-
tion covers all separate property of each party, regardless of when
acquired.52 The surviving spouse therefore could claim one third or
one half of all separate property that the decedent brought to the
marriage (e.g., a prior gift or inheritance from a relative) unless the
parties had executed a written agreement to the contrary during
the decedent's lifetime. 3
Transfers to a bona fide purchaser automatically are excluded
from the augmented estate.54 The bona fide purchaser exception
does not depend upon a showing that the decedent received ade-
quate and full consideration. Thus if a decedent sells an asset to an
unrelated third party in an arms' length transaction, he should not
have to be concerned that it would be included in his augmented
estate for failure to have received a higher price. The rule also does
not seem to require him to give up all rights in the property trans-
ferred. It appears that the decedent could sell a present partial in-
terest or a deferred interest such as a remainder to a third party
under like circumstances and remove a proportionate part of the
value (in the case of a partial interest) or the entire value (in the
case of a remainder interest) from his augmented estate. 55
The U.P.C. defines a bona fide purchaser as "a purchaser for
51. See id. § 20-107.3(D), (E).
52. Compare id. § 64.1-16.1 (Repl. Vol. 1987) with id. § 20-107.3(A)(1) (Repl. Vol. 1990).
53. See infra text accompanying notes 97-98. ,
54. See VA. CODE ANn. § 64.1-16.1 (Cum. Supp. 1990).
55. But see generally Gradow v. United States, 897 F.2d 516 (Fed. Cir. 1990), afl'g 11 Ct.
Cl. 808 (1989). Gradow held that an individual who sold a remainder interest in property
did not succeed in removing the property from her estate for federal tax purposes because
she received only the actuarial value of the remainder interest. The court found that "ade-
quate consideration" for this purpose would have been the full value of the property.
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value in good faith and without notice of any adverse claim, '5' and
"[a]ny recorded instrument on which a state documentary fee is
noted" is prima facie evidence that the transferee was a bona fide
purchaser.57 Since the Virginia statute does not include that par-
ticular U.P.C. provision, it appears that the parties-and ulti-
mately the courts-will have to define bona fide purchaser status
by reference to other similar contexts.58
As the augmented estate system is designed in part to prevent
an individual from defeating his spouse's statutory rights, the Vir-
ginia law of fraudulent conveyances may provide a helpful analogy.
There the Supreme Court of Virginia has said repeatedly that
transferees will be considered bona fide purchasers despite family
relationships or prior business dealings with the transferor, so long
as they have paid consideration and do not have actual or con-
structive knowledge or notice of any fraud by the transferor.5 9 This
approach is consistent with the dual goals of the new augmented
estate system: to protect the surviving spouse from attempts to de-
feat his statutory rights and at the same time to encourage free
transferability of property interests.
Many purchasers of assets from married individuals initially
may be reluctant to rely on the bona fide purchaser exception out
of fear of incurring additional expense to defend against a spouse's
later claims. To avoid being made participants in an equity suit by
the spouse after the decedent's death, they may seek to have the
spouse join in the conveyance. Those who are willing to risk being
made a party to such a suit60 may find that their title insurance
companies are not so inclined. If it becomes standard practice in
Virginia for purchasers to require the spouse's written consent in
56. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-202(3), 8 U.L.A. 77 (1983).
57. Id.
58. At least one other Uniform Act has included a definition of the term "bona fide pur-
chaser." The UNIF. MARITAL PROPERTY ACT, 9 U.L.A. 97 (1987), declares that a bona fide
purchaser is "a purchaser of property for value who: (i) has not knowingly been a party to
fraud or illegality affecting the interest of the spouses or other parties to the transaction; (ii)
does not have notice of an adverse claim by a spouse; and (iii) has acted in the transaction
in good faith." Id., 9 U.L.A. at 120.
59. See, e.g., Bank of Pocahontas v. Ferimer, 161 Va. 36, 41, 170 S.E. 591, 592 (1933); Neff
v. Edwards, 148 Va. 616, 627, 139 S.E. 291, 294 (1927).
60. Actual liability other than the expense of litigation may be minimal. Even if the
transferor was not a bona fide purchaser, the spouse must prove that the price fell short of
"adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth." The transferor must pay no
more than one third or one half of that shortfall, plus interest at the statutory rate. More-
over, he will be liable only to the extent that he still has the property or its proceeds.
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order to avoid the bona fide purchaser issue, the surviving spouse
will have at least as extensive a veto power over the decedent's
lifetime conveyances as the dower and curtesy rules currently
allow.6 1
Early versions of the U.P.C. did not contain the bona fide pur-
chaser exception; instead, the drafters added it in 1975 in response
to similar concerns expressed by the Colorado Bar Association. Its
purpose was to provide comfort to Colorado conveyancers, who had
been insisting that the transferor's spouse join in every deed so
that the spouse could not claim after the transferor's death that
the augmented estate should include any part of the value because
the consideration had been insufficient. At the same time, the
U.P.C. drafters created the presumption of bona fide purchaser
status arising from a recorded instrument on which a state docu-
mentary fee or transfer tax has been paid.6
Whether or not Virginia adopts a similar presumption, the bona
fide purchaser exception must be liberally construed if the goal is
to allow individuals to transfer property freely during lifetime.
Transferees will not rely on that exception unless they can be as-
sured that their knowledge of the transferor's marital status or
marital agreement, their own family relationship with him, or their
history of prior business dealings with him will not disqualify them
from bona fide purchaser status. Transferees also must be assured
that they will qualify as purchasers whenever they have engaged in
a voluntary transaction that is not a gift and that they need fur-
nish only such consideration as would support a simple contract,
whether through transferring other property or through other
means such as extending or promising to extend credit or securing
or partially or totally satisfying a pre-existing claim. Such liberal
construction seems consistent with the apparent legislative intent;
if the goal instead was to give the spouse an effective veto power
over the transferor's conveyance plans, then the bona fide pur-
chaser exception would have been superfluous.
The decedent's augmented estate likewise will not include any
tangible personal property transferred to the surviving spouse, re-
gardless of its nature or value. The rule acknowledges two every-
61. For example, the spouse's consent might be required not only in transfers of real es-
tate, but also in transfers of business interests and other personal property, particularly if
the business includes real estate.
62. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-202 comment, 8 U.L.A. 77, 80 (1975).
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day realities: most people do not keep records of the jewelry, cloth-
ing and other personal items they give to their spouses; and they
do not make such gifts to create an estate that the spouse can use
for later support. The exception, however, is not so narrowly
drawn. It applies not only to gifts of clothing and jewelry, for
which formal records usually are not available, but also to items
such as automobiles, where the date of gift, if not the donor's iden-
tity, can easily be established through state records. Moreover, it
applies to all gifts of tangibles regardless of value, so that a pair of
fifty dollar cuff links and a million dollar work of art are equally
excludable. To that extent, at least, the tangibles exception ap-
pears overbroad. 5
If only transfers after 1990 are considered, the product of the
inclusionary and exclusionary rules in section 64.1-16.1 of the Code
generally will give the surviving spouse a larger elective share than
the corresponding U.P.C. provisions would produce. The Virginia
exclusion of separate property acquired during the marriage may
reduce the size of some augmented estates. The exclusion of all
tangibles that the decedent transferred to the surviving spouse,
however, will increase the amount of other augmented estate prop-
erty the spouse may claim from the decedent's transferees because
it excludes some of the spouse's own property that otherwise would
be charged against his elective share. As noted above, moreover,
the U.P.C. estate includes gifts made within two years of death, to
the extent that they exceed $3,000,64 the amount of the gift tax
annual exclusion available when the U.P.C. model provision was
drafted.65 The Virginia definition includes all gifts in contempla-
tion of death, regardless of amount; it also includes all gifts in ex-
cess of the current federal annual gift tax exclusion amount, re-
gardless of how long before the decedent's death they were made.
The U.P.C. provision also specifically excludes life insurance, ac-
63. The exclusion for tangibles has no U.P.C. counterpart. The Virginia drafters appear
to have intended to exclude only tangibles that the decedent gave to the spouse and the
proceeds of those gifts, without also excluding tangibles that the spouse subsequently ac-
quired as the proceeds of real estate or intangible personal property received from the dece-
dent. The wording of the exclusion, however, might support a broader interpretation.
64. The U.P.C. drafters' comment observes that "a person can during his lifetime make
outright gifts to relatives and they are not included in [the augmented estate] unless they
are made within two years of death (the exception being designed to prevent a person from
depleting his estate in contemplation of death)." Id., 8 U.L.A. at 78.
65. I.R.C. § 2503(b) (1977). The exclusion was increased to $10,000 per donee for transfers
made after December 31, 1981. See id. § 2503(b) (West 1989) as amended by Pub. L. No.
97-34, 97th Cong., 95 Stat. 172 (1981).
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cident insurance, joint annuities, and pensions payable to anyone
other than the surviving spouse.6 In contrast, the Virginia defini-
tions of "estate" and "property" expressly include insurance poli-
cies, retirement benefits (exclusive of Social Security), annuities,
pension plans, deferred compensation arrangements, and employee
benefit plans to the extent the decedent owned, was vested in, or
could control them at his death or at the time he irrevocably trans-
ferred them.6
V. VALUATION PRINCIPLES
Property included in the augmented estate generally is valued as
of the decedent's death. Property that the decedent irrevocably
transferred during lifetime, however, is valued either at the dece-
dent's death or the time that the transferee first came into posses-
sion or enjoyment, whichever is earlier.6 ' Thus, date-of-death val-
ues will apply to all property the decedent has transferred to
anyone other than the surviving spouse, while retaining a right to
revoke the transfer or a right to enjoy the property or receive its
income. The valuation date of jointly-owned property will depend
upon whether the joint owner has come into possession or enjoy-
ment during the decedent's lifetime. Property that is the subject of
a causa mortis gift will be valued as of the decedent's death be-
cause the transfer potentially will be revocable until that time.
Transfers included in the augmented estate solely because they ex-
ceed $10,000 per year, however, will be valued as of the transfer
date; any appreciation before the decedent's death will escape the
reach of the statute.
Executors and administrators generally use federal estate tax
principles to value estate assets, 69 although state law contains dif-
ferent valuation rules for specific purposes such as calculating state
and local probate taxes.70 The personal representative, the surviv-
ing spouse, and the affected transferees must realize, however, that
66. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-202(1), 8 U.L.A. 76 (1983). The drafters' comment reveals that
life insurance was not included "because it is not ordinarily purchased as a way of depleting
the probate estate and avoiding the elective share of the spouse." Id. comment, 8 U.L.A. at
78.
67. See VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-16.1 (Cum. Supp. 1990).
68. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-16.1 (Cum. Supp. 1990).
69. See generally I.R.C. § 2031 (West 1989); Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (1988).
70. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.1-1714 (Cum. Supp. 1990) (allowing the personal representa-
tive to calculate state and local probate taxes using the city or county assessed value of real
estate).
1990]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:513
neither the federal estate tax rules nor the state exceptions will
apply in all cases to the augmented estate computation. Aug-
mented estate assets not irrevocably transferred to a third party
during the decedent's lifetime must be valued as of the decedent's
death, while the personal representative may elect to value the en-
tire estate for transfer tax purposes as of an alternate valuation
date, six months after the decedent's death.7 ' The augmented es-
tate system also contains no counterpart to the federal rule al-
lowing the personal representative to value the decedent's farm or
other real estate at its current use rather than its highest and best
use for estate tax purposes. 72
The rules for valuing life estates, remainder interests, deferred
payments, and estates for years also diverge from the federal sys-
tem, relying instead on the valuation tables in title 55 of the
Code.7" As a result, the parties cannot always rely on federal estate
tax values to determine the augmented estate value even if a fed-
eral estate tax return is due; instead, they may have to perform a
second set of calculations for some or all of the assets, using the
valuation principles of the augmented estate system.
Having determined the value of the augmented estate, the sur-
viving spouse then must compare one-third or one-half of that to-
71. See I.R.C. § 2032 (West 1989) (allowing the personal representative to use the six-
month alternate valuation if the result will be a smaller gross estate and thus a reduced
federal estate liability).
72. See id. § 2032A.
73. See VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-16.1 (Cum. Supp. 1990). This section requires life estates
and remainder interests to be valued "in the manner prescribed in Article 2 (§ 55-269.1 et
seq.) of Chapter 15 of Title 55" and deferred payments and estates for years to be dis-
counted to present value using "the interest rate [8%] specified in § 55-269.1." Id. These
tables contain factors for determining the value of life estates, estates for years, and other
similar interests and 'for commuting the value of a surviving spouse's dower or curtesy
rights. They are based upon an 8% assumed interest rate and upon factors established in
1973 using mortality data available then. See 1973 Va. Acts 491. In contrast, the personal
representative must determine the federal estate tax value of those interests by using special
IRS tables based upon current mortality data and assumed interest rates that change from
month to month. See I.R.S. Notice 89-60, 1989-1 C.B. 800, for the applicable tables and a
detailed description of the valuation method.
The state and federal tables can yield strikingly different results. For example, the federal
estate tax value of a ten-year interest in property is 63.49% using the 10.6% federal interest
rate in effect for November 1990, while the corresponding augmented estate value is 53.68%
using the assumed 8% state interest rate. Likewise, the life estate of a 60-year-old person is
valued at 78.68% for federal estate tax purposes and 67.37% for state property law purposes
as of November 1990. The disparity increases with the age of the life tenant, so that the




tal value (depending on whether the decedent left surviving de-
scendants) with the total value of all augmented estate assets that
the surviving spouse received during lifetime or that were desig-
nated for the surviving spouse at the decedent's death. If the value
of the elective fraction exceeds the aggregate value of the spouse's
augmented estate assets, the spouse will have a financial incentive
to claim an elective share.
VI. ELECTION PROCEDURE
Though the magnitude of the elective share may have changed
for 1991, the method of claiming it closely resembles the current
will renunciation procedure. 4 The spouse must make the election
either in person before the court having jurisdiction over adminis-
tration of the decedent's estate or in a written election signed and
acknowledged by the spouse and presented to the court or the
clerk for recordation. As under current law, the statute requires no
particular form of election; but a written election must be acknowl-
edged or proved in a manner that would make an instrument re-
cordable under title 55 of the Code.
Despite the procedural similarities, the augmented estate system
will force the surviving spouse to exercise election rights more
quickly. The elective share will be available only if the surviving
spouse makes the election within six months from the later of (i)
the date of probate, if the decedent was testate, or (ii) the date of
qualification, if the decedent was intestate. 5 Current law, which
applies only to testate estates, allows the surviving spouse to re-
nounce the will and claim a statutory share of the estate at any
time within one year after probate.7 6 In most estates that are sub-
ject to federal estate tax, the shorter deadline will allow the execu-
tor to determine what share is passing to the surviving spouse
before the estate tax returns are due.77 On the other hand, requir-
ing an election up to three months before the estate tax return is
74. Compare, VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-13, -14 (Cure. Supp. 1990) (effective Jan. 1, 1991) with
id. §§ 64.1-13, -14 (Repl. Vol. 1987) (effective through Dec. 31, 1990).
75. See id. § 64.1-14 (Cure. Supp. 1990). The election period does not begin at the dece-
dent death; therfore, the time does not start to run until there is either a probate or a
qualification.
76. See id. § 64.1-14 (Repl. Vol. 1987).
77. The federal and Virginia estate tax returns are due nine months after the decedent's
death. See I.R.C. § 6075(a) (West 1989); VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-905 (Cum. Supp. 1990). Un-
less probate or qualification is delayed more than three months after the decedent's death,
therefore, the deadline for the spouse's election will occur before either return is due.
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due may force the spouse to act before all of the assets have been
located or valued.
The spouse may obtain an extension of the six-month election
period if a suit is pending in equity to determine the amount or
value of property the spouse will receive under the will or the com-
position or value of the augmented estate. The spouse must seek
the extension from the circuit court having jurisdiction during the
original six-month period. Upon the spouse's petition, the court is
required to extend the election period to provide him "reasonable
time, not to exceed ninety days" to claim an elective share after a
final order has been entered in the pending suit.7 8
The shortened election period at first may appear likely to force
a surviving spouse to file suit to protect election rights even if es-
tate administration is proceeding normally. It is not unusual for
the personal representative still to be locating and valuing assets
and identifying liabilities six months after probate or qualification.
To assume that the process will have been completed even
sooner-in time for the surviving spouse to receive the information
and evaluate it before the six-month period expires-may be un-
realistic. The shorter election period that the augmented estate
system allows might seem likely to force into court many estate
matters that could have been settled privately under the previous
one-year renunciation rule. In that event, even if the parties ulti-
mately can agree on a suitable division, the estate will have in-
curred expense and publicity that would have been avoidable if the
election period were longer.
As a practical matter, however, the shorter period should not
have that effect. Unlike the current renunciation system, which
prohibits the renouncing spouse from taking any property under
the will, the augmented estate system appears to impose no pen-
alty on a spouse who claims an elective share. In effect, any spouse
who thinks he might obtain a larger portion of the estate by claim-
ing an elective share can make the election to preserve his rights.
Further investigation may reveal, for example, that the augmented
estate value is smaller than he believed, that the decedent's other
transferees no longer have the property or its proceeds, or that the
charging provisions will prevent him from receiving additional
property. It appears that he simply can keep the property he oth-
erwise is entitled to receive and refrain from pursuing his claim to
78. See VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-14 (Cure. Supp. 1990).
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an elective share. While the election will become part of the public
record, no suit in equity will be necessary unless there is actual
uncertainty about the augmented estate value or composition, or
the spouse cannot obtain the necessary information through less
formal methods.
VII. LIABILITY FOR THE ELECTIVE SHARE
The spouse who claims an elective share will receive a total of
one third (or one half) of the augmented estate. To the extent the
spouse already has received, or is entitled to receive, augmented
estate assets, their value will be applied first to reduce the elective
share liability.79 This approach avoids unnecessarily disrupting the
decedent's estate plan to the extent that he has made provisions
for the surviving spouse through lifetime gifts, bequests or devises
in his will, or non-probate transfers at death. The surviving spouse
cannot avoid this rule by refusing to accept those provisions; assets
that pass or have passed to the spouse are charged against his
share even if he has disclaimed them.8
Liability for the balance of the spouse's elective share does not
fall solely on the probate estate, although that fund might be the
most convenient source for payment because it is under the per-
sonal representative's control. The U.P.C. drafters and the Virginia
General Assembly have decided instead that each of the decedent's
transferees should bear a proportionate part of the elective share
burden.8' The statute therefore requires the elective share liability
to be "equitably apportioned among the recipients of the aug-
79. See VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-16.2(A) (Cum. Supp. 1990).
80. The drafters' comment on the corresponding U.P.C. provision says it was designed to
"have the effect of protecting a decedent's plan as far as it provides values for the surviving
spouse. The spouse is not compelled to accept the benefits devised by the decedent, but if
these benefits are rejected, the values involved are charged to the electing spouse as if the
devises were accepted." UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-207 comment, 8 U.L.A. 87 (1983).
81. The U.P.C. drafters' comments do not discuss this point. Appendix C of the 1984
STUDY REPORT lists arguments in favor of each approach. Placing the entire liability on the
probate estate would be "[e]asier than attempting to trace the property or proceeds of a
tainted transfer" and "[flairer to innocent transferees." 1984 STUDY REPORT, supra note 4,
at 19. On the other hand, spreading the burden among all recipients would provide a more
accurate augmented estate definition by ensuring that the recipient of a non-testamentary
transfer would have a direct interest in defending that transfer against inclusion in the aug-
mented estate. It also would more closely approximate the decedent's overall estate plan
than would placing the entire burden on the residuary beneficiaries because it would give all
beneficiaries the same portions of the total estate that the decedent intended them to have.
See id.
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mented estate in proportion to the value of their interests
therein. 8
2
The surviving spouse must receive interest at the legal rate from
the decedent's death until the elective share liability is satisfied. 3
This interest liability also is apportioned ratably among the recipi-
ents of augmented estate property. It is based solely on the statu-
tory rate, without consideration of the amount of income that the
estate or recipient has earned from the property.84
The surviving spouse, the decedent's personal representative or
any party in interest may petition the circuit court having jurisdic-
tion over the estate administration for a determination of (i) the
total amount of the elective share and (ii) the ratable portion at-
tributable to each person who is liable for contribution. The peti-
tion may seek relief against fewer than all of the interested parties,
but no one may be required to contribute any greater amount than
he would have had to contribute if the petitioner had secured relief
from all possible parties.8 5
The statute contains tracing provisions allowing the surviving
spouse to recover a portion of the elective share from the original
transferees from or appointees of the decedent and from persons
who received the property from them by gift or by testate or intes-
tate succession. Each original and successor transferee from the de-
cedent is liable only to the extent that he still has the property or
its proceeds.8 6 Thus an individual who has received augmented es-
tate property from the decedent can avoid liability to the surviving
spouse by disposing of the property.8 7 The lengths to which courts
will go to trace the property through the proceeds of successive
82. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-16.2(B) (Cum. Supp. 1990).
83. See id. § 64.1-16. The current legal interest rate is 8%. See id. § 6.1-330.53 (Repl. Vol.
1988).
84. A surviving spouse who has renounced the decedent's will is entitled to a proportion-
ate share of income earned on all probate personalty during administration. See Alexandria
Nat'l Bank v. Thomas, 213 Va. 620, 194 S.E.2.d 723 (1973).
85. See VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-16.2(D) (Cum. Supp. 1990).
86. See id. § 64.1-16.2(C). This statutory reference to "the property or its proceeds" indi-
cates that the parties should use a strict tracing approach that focuses on the disposition of
the particular asset in question rather than a more general accession-to-wealth approach
that would focus on whether the transferee has, for example, a higher net worth than he had
before the transfer.
87. Although the statute does not specify when the disposition must occur in order to
extinguish liability to the surviving spouse, the statutory purpose of protecting the spouse
will be dangerously compromised if the courts allow transferees to avoid contribution liabil-
ity by disposing of the property or its proceeds after the decedent's death.
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sales or exchanges remain unclear.
Even if the surviving spouse cannot recover from particular
transferees who have disposed of their property, however, he still
may have an incentive to identify that property so that it can be
included in the augmented estate. Including such unreachable
property in the augmented estate will have no effect if the dece-
dent has made no provision for the surviving spouse. But if any
property of the surviving spouse is included in the augmented es-
tate, adding unreachable assets can increase the amount of all ben-
eficiaries' liability, even though their proportionate shares remain
unchanged.8"
Any person liable for a portion of the elective share may choose
in writing from among four methods of satisfying his contribution
and interest liability. 9 First, he may convey to the surviving
spouse a portion of the augmented estate property equal in value
to his liability on the date he files his contribution statement. If he
chooses that method and his liability exceeds the total property
value, he may convey his entire interest in the property to the sur-
viving spouse in full satisfaction. Second, he may pay the value of
his liability in cash. Third, he may pay his liability in any other
property acceptable to the surviving spouse. Finally, he may elect
to use any combination of the proceeding three methods; but the
value conveyed and paid must equal his total liability. The con-
tributor must specify his choice in a writing filed with the circuit
court within thirty days after the order establishing his liability
becomes final and not subject to further appeal. If he does not do
so, the court will enter an order specifying the payment method."0
88. For example, assume that Wife's augmented estate is $600,000, including $50,000 of
lifetime gifts to Husband, $150,000 of excess lifetime gifts to children, other individuals and
charities who had spent the entire gift amount, and a $400,000 probate estate. If the gifts to
others were not included in Wife's augmented estate, Husband's elective share would be
one-third of $450,000 or $150,000. The excess liability after taking into account Wife's life-
time gifts to him would be $100,000, which would be apportioned equally to the two chil-
dren. If the irretrievable lifetime gifts to third parties were included in the augmented es-
tate, however, Husband's elective share would be one-third of $600,000 or $200,000. The
$150,000 excess liability would be apportioned among the estate beneficiaries according to
their interests, allocating 4/liths ($200,000/$550,000) to each child and 3/liths ($150,000/
$550,000) to the other beneficiaries. As a result, the children's total liability would increase
to slightly more than $109,000. The potential gain to Husband will depend on the relative
values of the augmented estate assets and the amount of his property that is included. Of
course, he also must balance the potential gain ($9,000 in this example) against any costs he
may incur to show that the other gifts were includable in the augmented estate.
89. See VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-16.2(E) (Cur. Supp. 1990).
90. See id.
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These liability provisions let the transferee decide whether to re-
turn a share of the augmented estate asset to the surviving spouse
or instead to satisfy his contribution liability in cash.9' The trans-
feree also may propose any other payment method he thinks rea-
sonable, but he actually may pay by that method only if the sur-
viving spouse approves. The spouse appears to have absolute
discretion whether to approve such a proposal or instead to force a
cash payment or a reconveyance of part of the original property. If
the transferee does not choose a payment method, the statute
places no limits on the court's discretion to order any payment
method or combination of methods. The U.P.C. drafters' com-
ments are silent on this issue because these detailed Virginia pay-
ment provisions have no direct U.P.C. counterpart.
VIII. BURDENS OF PROOF
The U.P.C. drafters acknowledge the apparent complexity of the
augmented estate system and the likelihood that litigation may be
required to determine the spouse's interest.2 Nevertheless, they
maintain that it will not complicate the administration of most es-
tates and, in fact, will reduce the number of instances in which the
spouse will claim an elective share. 3 The Virginia statute should
91. A valuation question arises if the transferee elects to convey an interest in the asset to
the spouse. The value of the augmented estate and thus the spouse's elective share is calcu-
lated as of the decedent's date of death or some earlier time. See supra text accompanying
note 69. Should the same values be used to determine the portion that the transferee must
convey or should the property interest be revalued as of the date on which the transferee
files his payment election with the court? The latter approach seems more nearly consistent
with the traditional rule that an electing spouse is entitled to the dollar value of the elective
share rather than to interests in specific assets. See Morriss v. Garland, 78 Va. 215, 225
(1883). It also seems consistent with the special statutory rule allowing the transferee to
satisfy his contribution liability by conveying his entire property interest if the value of the
interest on the filing date is less than the liability.
92. "The augmented net estate approach embodied in this section is relatively complex
and assumes that litigation may be required in cases in which the right to an elective share
is asserted." UNIF. PROn. CODE § 2-202 comment, 8 U.L.A. 79 (1983).
93. See generally id. Part 2 general comment, 8 U.L.A. 74.
Although the system described herein may seem complex, it should not complicate
administration of a married person's estate in any but very unusual cases. The sur-
viving spouse rather than the executor or the probate court has the burden of assert-
ing an election, as well as the burden of proving the matters which must be shown in
order to make a successful claim to more than he or she has received. Some of the
apparent complexity arises from Section 2-202 [VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-16.1], which has
the effect of compelling an electing spouse to allow credit for all funds attributable to
the decedent when the spouse, by electing, is claiming that more is due. This feature
should serve to reduce the number of instances in which an elective share will be
asserted.
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have a similar effect. The third-party transfer rules, while by no
means all-inclusive, will serve as a deterrent to individuals who
might seek to disinherit their spouses. The rules for transfers to
the spouse will deter spouses who have received significant shares
from seeking to claim an additional share of property that the de-
cedent's estate plan designates for other beneficiaries.
The number of elections made under the new augmented estate
system will depend in large part on who bears the burden of proof.
Under both the U.P.C. and the Virginia statute, a surviving spouse
who claims a share of the augmented estate has the burden of
showing what non-probate assets should be included.e4 As to each
challenged asset, the spouse must show not only that the transfer
was one of the types includable in the augmented estate but also
that (i) it occurred during the marriage, (ii) the decedent did not
receive adequate consideration, and (iii) the transferee was not a
bona fide purchaser.9 5
The burdens of proof under the Virginia statute and the U.P.C.
appear to diverge at this point. The U.P.C. presumes that property
owned by the surviving spouse at the decedent's death or previ-
ously transferred by the surviving spouse was derived from the de-
cedent, except to the extent that the surviving spouse can show it
was derived from another source.96 The Virginia statute, however,
can be read to impose on the personal representative or benefi-
ciaries the burden of proving what items of the spouse's current or
former property should be included in the augmented estate.
Without the benefit of the U.P.C. presumption, the personal repre-
Id. (emphasis in original).
94. See supra note 93 and accompanying text. The spouse may have personal knowledge
of some joint property interests, income rights, reserved powers of appointment or other
indicia of property that should be included in the decedent's augmented estate; and he may
be able to identify other assets from entries on the decedent's income tax or gift tax returns.
If the estate must file a federal estate tax return, the spouse also may be able to identify
assets from the personal representative's records. In nontaxable estates and in instances
where the personal representative declines to make his records available, however, the sur-
viving spouse may have to bring a suit in equity and seek information through more formal
discovery means.
95. The bona fide purchaser exception should be broadly interpreted. Where the decedent
received nominal consideration or none at all, proving that the transferee was not a bona
fide purchaser may not be difficult. Where any significant consideration passed to the dece-
dent, however, the spouse should be required to show, at a minimum, that a personal (non-
business) relationship existed between the decedent and the transferee and that the trans-
feree knew the decedent was attempting to circumvent the spouse's elective rights. See
supra text accompanying notes 54-62.
96. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-202, 8 U.L.A. 79 (1983).
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sentative may face a more difficult task than the spouse faced in
proving what third-party transfers should be included. First, most
people do not keep detailed records of interspousal transfers. Sec-
ond, the estate includes all of the decedent's gifts to the spouse,
regardless of when made. Any records that once may have existed
might not survive.
The U.P.C. presumption is consistent with the general philoso-
phy that a surviving spouse who seeks to claim a larger share than
the decedent left to him should have to prove that the amount the
decedent provided was inadequate. It also places the burden of
proving the source of the spouse's property on the only remaining
party with first-hand knowledge: the spouse. Adding such a pre-
sumption to the Virginia statute should reduce the risk of litiga-
tion and lighten the administrative burden of the personal repre-
sentative substantially without prejudicing the spouse's rights to
any significant extent.
IX. Loss OR RELINQUISHMENT OF ELECTION RIGHTS
Under well-established principles, the surviving spouse's actions
during the decedent's lifetime can prevent election rights from
arising at the decedent's death. The spouse can 'waive election
rights along with any other rights in the decedent's property by
entering into a binding pre-marital" or marital"8 agreement. In ad-
dition, a surviving spouse who wilfully deserted or abandoned the
decedent is denied any interest in the decedent's estate, including
a right to an elective share, if the desertion or abandonment con-
tinued until the decedent's death.9
In all other cases, the surviving spouse's right to claim an elec-
tive share becomes absolute at the decedent's death. The right,
however, is personal to the surviving spouse; and it will be lost if
he dies without having exercised it. 1°° If the surviving spouse be-
97. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-147 to -153 (Repl. Vol. 1990) (allowing prospective spouses
to enter into agreements to settle their property rights and other personal rights and obliga-
tions in contemplation of marriage). Among the permissible subjects of such premarital
agreements are "[t]he rights and obligations of each of the parties in any of the property of
either or both of them whenever and wherever acquired or located" and "[t]he disposition of
property upon ... death." Id. § 20-150.
98. See id. § 20-155 (authorizing married persons to enter into agreements governing their
respective rights and obligation§ to the same extent that prospective spouses could do so).
99. See id. § 64.1-16.3 (Cum. Supp. 1990).
100. The statute requires the surviving spouse to claim a share of the augmented estate
by appearing before the court in person or by signing an instrument that is presented for
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comes incapacitated, the current Virginia renunciation rule should
apply: the spouse's guardian or committee will have no power to
make the election, but the circuit court with jurisdiction over ad-
ministration of the decedent's estate will decide whether an elec-
tion is in the spouse's best interest and, if so, will claim the elective
share on the spouse's behalf.101 A competent surviving spouse will
lose all rights to an elective share by failing to make a valid elec-
tion within the prescribed time period, including any extensions.
Unlike the current renunciation rule, 10 2 however, it would seem
that the spouse should not lose election rights by accepting the
benefits provided in the decedent's will, as the election right repre-
sents a claim for additional non-probate assets and is not inconsis-
tent with a decision to accept probate property passing under the
ll.103
X. CONCLUSION
The confusing and often inconsistent system of dower and
curtesy rights-as well as such related arcana as jointure and equi-
table separate estates-will disappear from the Code in 1991, al-
though the transitional rule will retain vestiges of the old system.
The will renunciation system likewise will be completely trans-
formed. Though extremely complex after two centuries of develop-
ment, these systems were familiar to most practitioners, who have
grown comfortable with the basic concepts over the years.
The General Assembly has replaced those statutory provisions
with another complex system-the augmented estate. Practitioners
will need time to become comfortable with the new system. It in-
cludes many familiar concepts, some carried over from the dower,
curtesy and renunciation rules and some borrowed from federal
transfer tax laws. The inter-relation of these concepts in the new
system, however, may produce unexpected results on such issues as
separate property classification and bona fide purchaser status.
The augmented estate system is intended to simplify real estate
transfers and to restore to married individuals certain protections
that have been diminished by changes in society over the years.
recordation. It contains no mechanism for the spouse's personal representative to make the
election after the spouse's death. See generally id. § 64.1-13.
101. See First Nat'l Exchange Bank v. Hughson, 194 Va. 736, 74 S.E.2d 797 (1953).
102. See generally Simmons v. Simmons, 177 Va. 629, 15 S.E.2d 43 (1941).
103. See supra text following note 79.
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The elimination of dower and curtesy is a substantial step toward
the former goal; and, both by including in the augmented estate
certain non-probate transfers to third parties and by charging the
spouse's share with property received, the statute seems well
suited to accomplish the latter. In both areas, however, the statute
may require legislative or judicial adjustment. For example, sub-
jects for future consideration may include the extent of the bona
fide purchaser and separate property concepts, the scope of the
tangible personal property exception, the question of consideration
for certain transfers to the spouse, and the burden of proving those
transfers.
Other questions may arise as practitioners begin to use these
concepts in actual estate planning and administration. For the rest
of 1990, each practitioner should seek to become familiar with both
the new system that will become effective in 1991 and the planning
opportunities that may be available this year. While some may dis-
agree with the underlying policy decisions, the augmented estate
rules appear well-suited to implement those policies. The emphasis
now must be on understanding and working within the new
system.
540 [Vol. 24:513
